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TANYA DALZIELL, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
There are two short passages that serve as prologues to Gail Jones’s novel Black
Mirror. The first relates the aesthetic apprehension of Anna Griffin in an inclem-
ent London street: “And later, when Victoria is dead, she [Anna] will remember
how on this day of their very first meeting she was so distracted she became
soaked before she recalled her umbrella” (1). The second focuses on Victoria Morrell.
Victoria is a once-celebrated avant-garde artist, and from her window she simul-
taneously watches a woman moving through the downpour towards her front-
door and thinks: “I am waiting for this visitor so that I can tell my story and die” (3).
Anna Griffin is the young woman who Victoria sees cross the street: it is she who
has been commissioned to write a biography of Victoria’s life. As such, the open-
ing passages intimately link images of women who are presently strangers to each
other, but whose lives come to entertain unlikely intersections, particularly around
childhood memories of a Western Australian gold-mining town, as the narrative
unfolds non-linearly. Furthermore, in their shared interest to represent the same
moment from different positions, these sections of the text resemble two modern
art forms on which the book repeatedly reflects: the ambitions of the early twen-
tieth-century avant garde, and the malleable vision of the world that film makes
possible. Yet, what is especially striking about these incipient passages of a novel
that is conspicuously, and in many ways painfully, marked by multiple forms of
loss, trauma and grief—mothers are lost and mourned; the aching presence of the
colossal absence of loved ones is palpable; the traumas of colonialism bring about
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a dissociation of affect and representation—is their thanatic preoccupations, their
ruminations on death. In the first passage, which contorts time tellingly, Anna’s
future memory of her confused, damp state on that wet day centres on Victoria’s
death as both past and imminent. In the second section, death, or rather the
thought of an impending, inescapable and utterly individual death, surfaces al-
most involuntarily and is bound with both the advent of this visitor and story-
telling itself.
This article argues that Black Mirror operates, in part, under the sign of what
might be called proleptic mourning, a struggling with the ethical knowledge that
mourning necessarily begins before death proper. This idea, which stems from
Jacques Derrida’s ruminations on (the impossibility of ) mourning and friend-
ship, will be explored later in more detail. For now, however, it is pertinent to
acknowledge that in the context of this article’s insistence on the novel’s musings
on loss, the text has been formally recognised for its contribution to “life-writ-
ing,” with its receipt in 2003 of the Nita B. Kibble Award. Less a consolidated
genre than an inclusive assemblages of narratives that “challenge the limits of
autobiography,” life-writing sets in motion questions about what it might mean
to give an account of a self (Henke xiii). It interrogates the status of the self and
surveys the role of narrative in such an inventory; or, more precisely and in the
words of Shoshana Felman, life-writing can be provisionally imagined as “a point
of conflation between text and life” (qtd. in Henke xii). More than this, though,
and as Black Mirror makes clear, life-writing is closely involved in a number of
ethical questions.1
There are at least two, overlapping ethical interests that preoccupy Jones’s life-
writing as it manifests in Black Mirror. The first resonates with Martha Nussbaum’s
philosophical assertion that the concentrated question—how should one live?—
is that which has motivated much recent and not-so-recent engagement with the
ethical (36). However, Black Mirror considers not only how one should live, as
Nussbaum suggests, but also how one ought to live (and write) in anticipation of
both one’s own and an other’s death. From this extension of Nussbaum’s primary
inquiry, the novel poses a related question: what might it mean—ethically—for
someone to represent or narrate an other’s life? It asks: how should one live in
anticipation of an other’s death and in testimony to the integrity of the proximate
life lived? Is the act of narrating an other’s life a violation of that responsibility? Or
can it be an ethical testimony to being in the world?
Most obviously, the cogitations these inquiries encourage are of immediate inter-
est to Anna, Victoria’s named biographer. And it is fair to say that biography, a
genre that routinely imposes a narrative form on an otherwise chaotic, fragmented
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and excessive life, is treated with some suspicion in Black Mirror. Early in the text,
biography is referred to as a “meanly simplifying genre” (16), and this might
account for why Anna, “striving against the treason of images that Victoria has
presented her with,” is said to “try to meet Victoria Morrell once again.
Novelistically” (156). However, the novel does not disregard biography in its
entirety in favour of fiction. Nor does it insist on discrete distinctions between
these narrative forms. Instead, it extracts from biography the question par excel-
lence that motors this genre: who are you? And what it does with this question is
expose it to a critical opening in an effort to honour the subject to whom it is
addressed. As the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas would have it, the text lets the
question remain an extended one, without expectation of a final, definitive an-
swer. In other words, the novel raises issues that resonate well beyond the boundaries
of biography and speak to wider deliberations on ethics that, by some accounts,
are enjoying a renaissance of sorts in which “literature” plays a pivotal part.
Nussbaum’s work is useful for thinking further about these relations between
ethics and literature as well as the issues that preoccupy Black Mirror. Like Anna
in Jones’s text, Nussbaum is interested in the potential of literature, of forms of
representation that are “novelistic,” to approach and interrogate the ethical. Yet,
one of the things that puzzles Nussbaum and which seems primarily to motivate
her interest in literature as a site for ethical thinking is the apparent refusal of
literature’s attendant fields—literary theory and cultural criticism—to engage
with the ethical. For Nussbaum, critical theory (read here a rather reductive con-
cept of “poststructuralism”) and literary studies more generally has shied away
from entering into the lively debate on ethics that characterises much contempo-
rary philosophical thinking.2 By centring intellectual attention on the (infinitely
deferred) logic of language rather than the practicalities of how social beings might
live in the world and with each other, literary criticism has sidestepped some of
the most pressing questions that face us today, or so Nussbaum suggests. In the
face of this apparent reluctance to engage with the ethical, in the context of the
relentless and nihilistic textual free-play of poststructuralism, Nussbaum seeks to
reverse radically this supposed unwillingness by proposing that literature is peer-
less in its ethical potential. It is in the forms as well as themes of literature,
Nussbaum argues, that the world is laid out for intimate, ethical inspection re-
garding questions of how to live.
Notwithstanding the refusal to examine the historical and ideological forces that
shape the category of literature, and despite some of the assumptions made with
regard to the attitude of literary studies to ethics, Nussbaum’s meditations raise a
number of important issues that are directly relevant to the inquiries around
which Black Mirror turns.3 The mode of cultural production that Nussbaum
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favours, with its imaginative possibilities, is understood to challenge current think-
ing in/of ethics, an interest shared by Jones’s novel. Nussbaum privileges what
commentators have nominated as “a different sort of eye, attentive to different
sorts of things”; not a thesis, as in the case of a “straight” philosophical treatise,
but rather a “subjunctive mood” that “deals in possibilities, ifs, conditions. Its
form is interrogative” (Diamond 49; Adamson 103). Admittedly, and if these
interpretations are accepted, then it may be that Nussbaum has much in com-
mon with those positions of which she is somewhat dismissive or oblivious. After
all, each approach would appear to argue that ethical responsibilities lie, or are
produced, at the moment of reading, of writing, when the very possibility of
ethics is put into question. Such critiques aside, ethics in the “literary” sense that
Nussbaum propounds in response to the question of how to live is vastly different
from the foundational premises of moral philosophy, with their universal sweep
and propensity to fix moral guidelines in advance of specific events or contexts.4
And her conceits are suggestive for thinking about Black Mirror and its specific
preoccupations with the ethics of writing a life of an other in the face of loss.
At a most private and vulnerable moment in the novel, which also entails an
express element of affectionate voyeurism, Jones writes:
Within just a month, Victoria has weakened. It is as if giving up her
own stories depletes her of something vital. Yet she is an avid narra-
tor, and looks forward to Anna’s coming as though her life depended
on it; this contradiction is somehow at the basis of their relationship.
How it is possible, Anna asks herself, that Victoria wills her own
fading, just as she comes so amply into being?
Sometimes she watches the old woman sleeping and sees the delicate blue flicker
on the process of her dreams. She persuades herself that biography is futile. Be-
neath closed eyes lies this woman’s inaccessible complexity (108).
The novel enacts what might be termed ethical hesitancy at the very moment
that Anna’s reading/watching and writing of this dying woman recognises Victo-
ria’s alterity. Here, narrative gives life at the same time that it is posited as a
menace, a threat to life. It is the impending loss of life, however, which requires
both a witness to this immoderate activity of story-telling and narrating itself
that, most crucially, is recognised as partial and incomplete, and indeed remote.
Anna, the receiver of Victoria’s stories (or perhaps the producer of them in the
“otobiographical” sense that without her as listener, as witness, the accounts would
not be told), suspends any demand for complete coherence of self and story that
biography might claim with its arresting desires (see Derrida’s Ear). Creative at-
tendance, in the interrogative mode Nussbaum advocates, obviates such
appropriative aspirations and points to an ethical encounter that asserts Victoria’s
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unique presence, an insistence that appears, paradoxically, all the more pressing
and impossible in the face of the older woman’s imminent death.
Indeed, the written narrative with which Anna is charged has been commissioned
in the knowledge that Victoria is dying. In other words, and in addition to the
intricate ethical dilemmas that are set in motion by Anna as the would-be biogra-
pher, or more precisely, by the social contract into which she is called, Victoria’s
proximate death also raises questions of how to mourn. These are not separate
issues. Like biography, mourning runs the risk of ventriloquising the other, of
speaking on their behalf, of reducing the alterity of the subject to the same, to the
self. (This is the digestive philosophy of which Levinas is sceptical and against
which Derrida rallies.) In the more specific context of Black Mirror, Victoria’s
impending death is linked inextricably to her petition for her life to be recorded
and narrated by Anna. Yet, the detail to stress is that her death is anticipated and,
as such, it points to a wider concern of the novel that is obliquely referenced in its
opening sections, namely that prescient grieving—proleptic mourning—lies at
the (ethical) heart of friendships.
Friendships, of course, are many things to many people—voluntary allegiances,
means of social support and respect, relations of intimacy (and hence all-too vul-
nerable to betrayals and exposures)—and it would be incautious to reduce such
composite and involved social relations to any one condition.5 Nevertheless, it is
crucial to recognise that the various friendships and relationships represented in
Black Mirror are relentlessly marked by (the spectres of ) loss.
Not only is Victoria dying, with Anna as the immediate, adoring witness and
mourner, but Victoria herself is haunted by her lover, Jules, to whom she was
unfaithful and whom she suspects was killed during the holocaust: “When she
was alone, Victoria thought often of Jules; over the span of absence his phantom
arm still lay warmly across her breast, cupping her heart. Sometimes she resented
this everyday haunting he had bequeathed her. The stories he left behind—with
no body to attach them to” (112). As a child, Anna recites personal prayers to
protect her father from an always-anticipated death in the depths of the dark
mines in which he labours—“Gentle Jesus kind and wise, Let my father be alive”—
and Griffo himself, her father, is imagined in life to have “the dismal appearance
of a corpse” (126). This is a quality shared by Victoria’s mother, Rose, who, in
“the only known photograph of Victoria’s whole family” looks “almost lifeless. . . .
She has less than one year to live and her eyes seem to know it” (166). It is an
attentiveness that her own lover, William (the chauffer who is also Victoria’s fa-
ther), also carries on his grieving body when he learns of her death: “he became
thin and spectre-like; his skin was blue and pallid” (220). Lily-white, the Abo-
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riginal woman who Victoria’s mother employs as a servant and who becomes the
“outline that Herbert Morrell, mine-owner, desired,” suffers sexually and vio-
lently at the hands of both Herbert and his highly-disagreeable son, Henry. Her
trauma is unmistakable and Victoria feels her absence keenly: “Perhaps, after all,
it was Lily-white I was missing. Am. Am missing,” she tells Anna (227). Anna’s
own intimate relationship with Winston, her married lover from Jamaica who is
studying the plays of Shakespeare for their representations of slaves, is also in-
scribed in a casual but nevertheless telling way by the knowledge of inevitable
loss:
Anna watches as he [Winston] fumbles with a box of matches.
Let me, she offers. These things will kill you.
In the long run, as Keynes says, we’re all dead.
Some consolation! (133)
Anna frequently engages with the everyday things—narratives, matches and ciga-
rettes—that are imagined “to kill” the friends (Victoria and Winston respectively)
for whom she develops earnest, if at times tested, affection. Yet, it is important
that she finds little comfort in Winston’s flippant reference to Keynes, which
reduces “us” to the same in death and ostensibly serves as a solace of sorts. After
all, just as Anna grapples with the ethical implications of imposing a genre on a
life lived, the novel itself, characterised by shifts in narrative time, is distrustful of
the elegiac mode, which conventionally works to resolve grief following the loss of
a loved one by offering compensatory creativity. In Black Mirror, these ideas of
successful mourning are called into question (not least in the sense that modes of
mourning and the ethical questions they lay open seem to commence prior to the
death of a friend, however counter-intuitive this may seem), and challenge any
attempt to exchange sorrow for artistic consolation. Again the novel asks how to
live, how to write, in anticipation of an other’s death and in testimony to the
integrity of the proximate life lived.
Proleptic mourning is the law of friendship of which Derrida writes in his works on
mourning, works which are resolutely ethical in their engagement with the ques-
tion of how to mourn, how to represent loss, and the impossibility of representing
such loss. For Derrida, prescient grieving predates specific friendships that bring
unique subjects into relations of affect and address; it is something half-articulated
and already at work before particular friendships are formed and unique losses are
inevitably suffered. He writes: “the anticipation of death comes so indisputably to
hollow out the living present that precedes it” (The Work of Mourning 151). Fur-
ther, Derrida’s ruminations on mourning return regularly to questions of fidelity
and responsibility to the friend forever lost. They are attuned to the dangers of
rendering mourning a narcissistic act, which violently reduces the alterity of the
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beloved friend to the same, to the self. As such, they also enact formally their osten-
sible subject in so far as they consist of a series of unique yet repetitive attempts to
mourn, thus stressing a resolute lack of closure that is echoed in Victoria’s ongoing
haunting by Jules and by Lily-white. Black Mirror is a text that similarly does not
find easy consolation in the face of particular, historical loss.
For many commentators like Eric Santner, Dominick LaCapra, Greg Forter and
Gillian Rose, such a “refusal to mourn,” in Sigmund Freud’s now all-too-familiar
and contentious phrase,6 signals a troubling moment in contemporary critical
philosophy. In brief, the apparent recuperation of mourning as a revolutionary
force (by Paul de Man in particular, as well as Derrida)—firstly, by rejecting its
persistent pathologisations in the domain of psychoanalysis; secondly, by dis-
trusting the restitutions and consolations that “normal mourning” implies; and,
thirdly, by investing in the trans-historical idea that any subject constituted in
language is ineradicably melancholic—also carries with it a significant detach-
ment from the crippling affect of melancholia. Furthermore, it runs the risk of
overlooking the possibility that historical losses surpass those that entry into lan-
guage purportedly engenders.
In other words, there is a seeming impasse in recent thinking on mourning. One
position stresses the ongoing responsibilities of the surviving friend to the unique
friend lost in its efforts to reframe mourning in ethical terms. Another emphasises
the imperative of psychological and emotional health for the surviving friend that
a refusal to mourn purportedly threatens. Whereas the latter position rehearses
the critiques of the former already mentioned, the former disputes most fiercely
the sense of closure to which the latter appears to aspire. This is so, not least
because its own project turns around “an aporetic work of mourning that suc-
ceeds when it fails, which is to say that is cannot be resolved” (Ricciardi 12). For
the former, successful mourning is mechanistic, prescriptive and forgetful, and it
assumes the possibility of some triumph over the past. In short, successful mourning
refuses the active critical engagement with the radical enigma of the dead, of loss,
that ethical mourning demands.
Black Mirror signals a negotiation of these two positions as it works to reject the
reduction of otherness to sameness that marks much moral philosophy, a reduc-
tion that Nussbaum seeks to avoid, and which is also a very real possibility in the
process of mourning itself. After all, if the interiorisation of (the memory of ) the
beloved is indeed a component of mourning, the degree to which the lost friend
comes to be animated only within the living self runs the unethical risk of reduc-
ing this friend to the self. However, the novel is also attentive to those who suffer
loss and entertains not so much “healthy” closure or melancholic encryption as
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the possibility of redemption, of affirmation.7 In other words, the “answers” it
offers in response to the questions it raises—how to live, how to write in anticipa-
tion of an other’s death and in testimony to the integrity of the proximate life
lived?—are presented in terms of an ethical unknowingness, of an ongoing nego-
tiation with the interpretive challenge that the enigma of loss, of death, demands
that addresses both the friend lost and the surviving friend. In Black Mirror, proleptic
mourning, as an ethical encounter, insists on Victoria’s presence, on her singular
alterity, at the same time that preparations are made for this friend to be vital
within Anna’s living self, and within the novelistic biography she has been called
on to write.
Hence, the trope of the “black mirror” that lends itself to the title of the text, to
symbols in Victoria’s art productions, and to the name given to a series of stories
that Victoria relates to Anna. Jones writes:
Victoria said:
I have several Black Mirror stories and I will give you three.
What are the Black Stories, my Anna-lytical?
They are myself, unrecognisable. They are myself, writing disaster.
I looked into a mirror and darkness looked back. (213)
With its insistence on opacity, the trope of the black mirror warns against any
romanticised notion of reciprocal recognition, or indeed misrecognition, whereby
one subject simply mirrors an other. It also cautions against the assumption that
one might be easily recognisable to one’s self, that the subject might be effort-
lessly self-grounded in an unquestioned humanist sense. As Victoria again recog-
nises with her last breaths, the self is not easily or readily transparent: “I looked
into the mirror and darkness looked back” (272). Further, the trope of the black
mirror is linked with traumatic losses and memories—the writing of the disaster
distinctly echoes Maurice Blanchot’s unconsoling insistence on the
unrepresentable, the erasure, that the catastrophe brings into being—which Anna
is called upon to witness. These moments turn around the absent mother figures,
Rose and Lily-white, and a long-lost sister, Ruby, a murdered lover, a miscarried
baby conceived by rape. Clearly, such losses and traumatic memories are not the
“major historical events” that Dominick LaCapra privileges for “elucidating trauma
and its aftereffects” (ix). Rather, these are local, personal experiences. Yet, they are
nevertheless resolutely specific and historical, and their ongoing impact is regis-
tered in Victoria’s search for a sympathetic listener. Indeed, a sympathetic listener
is what Victoria seeks rather than a biographer per se. It is with Anna that she re-
constructs her life stories, however incomplete, and as she tells her stories, Anna
too begins to relate partial accounts of herself, of memory, of shame, of possibility.
In so doing, both women enter into what the novel proposes as ethical forms of
understanding and responsibility.
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Indeed, much trauma theory, such as the work of Cathy Caruth, suggests that for
traumatic memory to be assimilable and “worked through” by the traumatised
subject, communication must be achieved through an encounter with a sympa-
thetic listener. The novel attends to this affective imperative. Yet, it also refuses in
its ethical stance to intimate that this sympathetic recognition is absolute in a
way that might suggest that the listener reduces or assimilates the other, and their
stories, to the self. Thus, it is significant that Victoria withholds from Anna her
other black mirror stories. It suggests that her life exceeds any account that she or
Anna may give to it. Further, it signals a reflexive activity that is both a re-con-
struction of the self and a “rhetorical context for responsibility” (Butler 31). For
Anna’s part, in asking the question—who are you?—but by letting it remain
open (rather than demanding a closed circuit), there is a recognition of Victoria’s
trauma and alterity. Indeed, it is a recognition based less on totalising knowledge
than a perspicacity and acceptance of the limits of knowledge which implicate the
women ethically in each other’s lives, as well as deaths, as the penultimate scene
in the novel suggests. Having returned home to the gold-mining town with Vic-
toria’s ashes, Anna re-encounters her father and experiences the inexact yet palpa-
ble affect of loss:
Grief was this strange folding in, Anna reflected, this recursion of
something dark tucking under like a wave. Already Victoria’s face
was vanishing. Already silence was easier than words. Anna took her
dark fold, this irrevocable reshaping, this crypt inside and walked
past her father, out into the noisy night. (294)
Anna is then immediately represented amongst the bones of the dead in the
Parisian catacombs. She moves “through the ancient tunnels as though in another
body, and not in a grave” (300). The spatial limits of interiorisation—of inside
and outside—that the metaphor of the crypt makes clear in both passages, and
that mourning conventionally entails, are complicated here. In this domain of the
dead through which the living move (the inverse of prevailing understandings of
mourning that imagine the living as a vault for the dead), the most important and
pressing of ethical bonds is forwarded: a recognition of the reciprocal responsibili-
ties of the living and the dead. With an obligation to let live the alterity of the lost
friend, that friend is carried hesitantly, rather than cannibalistically, in the living
friend as memory (which itself runs the “risk” of loss, of vanishing), while the
dead, as an inspired body, envelop the living—a haunting, unsettling and persist-
ent presence.
Further, it is this experience of grief, of mourning, that seems ultimately to reani-
mate rather than paralyse Anna as she “marches past waste and elimination and
follows in the breezy wake of the young people ahead of her” (301). Mourning is
by no means neatly resolved in Black Mirror; it is ongoing and aching, and the
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dead continue to issue ethical challenges to the living. However, this “refusal to
mourn” that the novel takes seriously is not an incapacitating melancholia; it is
affirmative, redemptive, a hard-to-describe folding out (as well as folding in) that
allows Anna to begin to see the world intensely and anew. With respect to her
once spectre-like father, Anna notes that: “Without his cloak of dirt . . . and with
his beloved Lola [her father’s wife], my father is like Lazarus, returned from the
grave” (283). At her loss of Winston, who returns inevitably to his family in
Jamaica, Anna is now said to face “the night without imagining loss and defi-
ciency” (292).
Affirmation and hope are made possible not by exorcising ghosts of the dead, of
the lost, but by entertaining them, however unsettling, painful and confronting
this may prove to be. And this approach to loss is particularly important in rela-
tion to the text’s concern with ethical responses to the claims of the past. In its
formal and thematic preoccupations with memory, the novel is highly responsive
to Australia’s colonial past in the contemporary present. Hence, it is significant
that the novel “concludes,” albeit inconclusively, with the image of the site at
which Lily-white buried in quiet ceremony not a body—this is not a grave—but
rather the life-sustaining placenta “she gave birth to with her daughter, Ruby”
(301). It is Ruby, Victoria’s sister, to whom Anna gives the older woman’s ashes
on return to the gold-mining town. In turn, Ruby offers Anna, the wary biogra-
pher, a gift of narrative that both sets in motion other ghosts of the past that have
been hitherto suppressed and confirms the interwoven lives of Victoria, Anna and
Ruby. And the imagining of this special site is one of redemption—a recovery of
the land—in the face of “all the mine-work and despoliation that is everywhere
around” (301). The scars of settler capitalism are perceptible on the land and the
wounds its agents inflict are appallingly and traumatically apparent with the
partial blinding of Lily-white by Henry Morrell: “Her wounding had fixed her
forever in a moment of distress, and left her there, marooned” (193). Yet, this
site, and the positioning of its image at the end of the novel, is significant. It
determines that the (effects of these) acts and contested histories will not be laid
to rest and recognises that there are additional narratives still to be told, or indeed
withheld, in so far as the site is “both the unregarded and persisting monument
of countless other stories” (301). Unlike Herbert Morrell, the inveterate collector-
colonial-capitalist who obsessively seeks to possess, in the form of private prop-
erty, objects, cultures and people from across the globe, the novel deliberately
acknowledges the limits of its knowledge and reach.
The loss, trauma and grief that mark Black Mirror are palpable. There is a pro-
found sense, however, that the recurrent processes of mourning that keep alive
those who are lost are imperative, ethically and politically, and do not necessarily
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deaden the survivors. Rather, each unique occasion of mourning demands an on-
going interrogation of ethics itself and solicits active, critical responses and repre-
sentations that leave open the question of how one should live and represent
others in the face of (multiple, impending) losses.
ENDNOTES
1 For texts that address in detail the ethics of life-writing see Eakin and Onley.
2 Nussbaum’s assertions fail to address why it might be that literary scholars
and theorists have declined to engage with ethics, to the extent that her
suppositions can be provisionally considered in the spirit of philosophical
speculation. Casting an eye across the field of philosophy—the self-pro-
claimed “home” for the study of ethics—it is clear that for many scholars
who conceive of ethics as a field of philosophical interest, it is not ethics
itself that should be the subject of scrutiny. Instead, human actions that are
possible in answer to that fundamental question—how should one live?—
must be interrogated. In short, ethical thought and understanding is imag-
ined to begin with normative, rational universal principles that are removed
from any political, historical, affective and social contexts or determinants.
3 Nussbaum’s overview of the current state of literary theory is somewhat lim-
ited. It omits the possibility that an ethical strain, or strains, might already
run through much literary theory, albeit in a guise—feminism, post-coloni-
alism, Marxism—that is not easily recognisable as such by the dominant
frameworks through which philosophies might conceive of ethics. It also
declines to admit the possibility that the very practices that are chastised for
their abandonment of the ethical might themselves be implicated in the
apparent revived interest in ethics. Simon Critchley is not alone when he
suggests, for instance, that “deconstruction should be understood as an ethical
demand,” (1) not least on the basis of its efforts to call into question, among
other things, ethics itself.
4 These universalist claims of moral philosophy have troubled theorists and
critics trained to privilege pragmatism (here Lyotard’s work is especially in-
fluential) as well as difference, pluralism, particularity and anti-
foundationalism (Lyotard and Thebaud). For these scholars, the absolute
criteria that underpin ethics, which lie beyond question, are not indisput-
able truths that sensibly ground systems of thought, wisely guide our moral
judgements and generally maintain social order. Rather, they are the deeply
troubling means by which relations of power are organised ideologically.
5 For some (very different) philosophical accounts of friendship, see Fried-
man’s What Are Friends For?, Blanchot’s Friendship, and Derrida’s Politics.
6 For Freud, in “Mourning and Melancholia,” the successful work of mourn-
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ing involves the painful but necessary severing of libidinal ties to a deceased
beloved, with the result that the freed ego may then attach itself to a new
object of desire (Freud, Standard Vol 14). Melancholia is a symptom of
“failed mourning”: the ego libidinally identifies with the lost object to the
degree that the loss of the other is experienced as a loss of the self, and the
mourner enters a state of stasis, wherein grief is unresolved. Freud would
later return to the issues of mourning and melancholia in his 1923 study,
“The Ego and the Id,” conceding that the hierarchical binary he had origi-
nally conceived of as the relation between mourning and melancholia was
inadequate to account for the complexities of grief (Freud Standard Vol 19).
7 In a recent interview, Jones commented: “I do think grief is one of the most
tenacious emotions. It does not go away easily and it does wreak damage,
and I’ve thought a lot about what it is that gets people through, what does
it mean to move from grief into affirmation” (“Artistic Light” 7).
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